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INTRODUCTION 
 The principle of separation of powers among the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary is of fundamental importance to modern democracy. The separation of powers 
among the three authorities means mutual checks and balances among them which guarantee 
the limitation of any excess of power by other powers. One of the importance hallmarks of a 
state that respects this principle is the independence of the judiciary. In fact, the independence 
of the judiciary is a logical corollary of the principle of separation of powers in the sense that 
the vesting of judicial functions in a body separate from the legislature and the executive can 
only be meaningful if that body is truly independent. 
 Every constitution that had been promulgated in Thailand since the change from 
absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932 embraced the principle of separation 
of powers. The current one - the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007) 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”) stipulates that Thailand adopts a democratic 
regime of government with the King as Head of State.
1
 Sovereign powers belong to the Thai 
people. The King as Head of State shall exercise such powers through the National 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. The performance of duties of the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, 
the Courts, Constitutional organs and States agencies shall be in accordance with the rule of 
law.
2
  
 The Constitution contains one chapter - Chapter X the Courts - dealing with the 
judicial powers. Chapter X is divided into 5 parts. Part 1 is the General Provisions which 
states the general principles regarding the judicial powers, while Parts 2, 3, 4, 5 contain 
provisions concerning the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative 
Courts and the Military Courts respectively. The division of the Chapter in this fashion 
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signifies that the Judiciary or the Court system in Thailand is a parallel system of judicial 
jurisdiction with 4 types of courts. 
 Judicial powers, as one aspect of sovereign powers, are vested in the Courts. This is 
affirmed in the Constitution which provides that the trial and adjudication of cases are the 
powers of the Courts, which must be carried out with due regard to justice in accordance with 
the Constitution, laws and in the name of the King. Judges are independent in the proper, 
swift and fair trial and adjudication of cases in accordance with the Constitution and laws.
3
  
 This means that only the Courts can exercise judicial powers to ensure justice. The 
Constitutional Court, just like other Courts in the system, is independent and has to decide 
constitutional cases in accordance with the Constitution and laws.  
 Various guarantees of independence of the Constitutional Court are specified in the 
Constitution and related laws. These guarantees will now be examined.  
I. The independence of the Constitutional Court as an institution 
 In constitutional democracy, the constitution is regarded as supreme. This principle of 
the supremacy of the constitution is reflected in the Constitution that the Constitution is 
supreme law of the State. The provisions of any law, rule and regulation, which are contrary 
to or inconsistent with the Constitution will be unenforceable.
4
   
 The Constitutional Court performs the important function of safeguarding this 
supremacy of the Constitution. It also serves as a judicial body which recognizes and protects 
the rights and liberties of the people and translate into reality the protection of rights and 
liberties by the exercise of adjudicative power. 
 The constitutional status of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court was established by virtue of the Constitution. It consists of 
the President and eight judges to be appointed by the King upon advice of the Senate.
5
 Judges 
of the Constitutional Court are styled “Justices of the Constitutional Court”. 
 The Constitution provides for the Constitutional Court to have powers and duties in 
adjudicating and ruling constitutional cases. These powers and duties may be divided into the 
following nine categories: 
 (1) constitutional review of bills and draft rules of procedure of the legislative branch 
prior to their promulgation to ensure that they are not inconsistent with or contrary to the 
Constitution;
6
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(2) constitutional review of a promulgated law to ensure that it is not inconsistent with 
or contrary to the Constitution;
7
 
 (3) constitutional review of the prerequisites for the enactment of an Emergency 
Decree to ensure that it is not inconsistent with or contrary to the Constitution;
8
   
(4) ruling on whether or not members of the House of Representatives, senators         
or members of the committee are involved directly or indirectly in the use of the 
appropriations;
9
 
(5) ruling on disputes regarding the powers and duties among the National Assembly, 
the Council of Ministers or the Constitutional organs other than the Courts which arise 
between two or more of such organs;
10
 
(6) review resolutions or regulations of political parties, consideration of appeals of 
members of the House of Representatives and ruling on cases concerning the constitutional 
exercise of political rights and liberties by a person or a political party;
11
 
(7) ruling on the membership or qualification of a member of the National Assembly, 
Ministers and Election Commissioners;
12
 
(8) ruling on whether or not a treaty requires prior approval of the National 
Assembly;
13
 
(9) powers and duties prescribed under the Organic Act on Political Parties, B.E. 2550 
(2007).
14
 
Regulatory autonomy and administrative autonomy 
The Constitutional Court has the autonomy to organize itself with regard to case 
management as well as the general administration of the Court. The Court has an   
independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the Office of the Constitutional Court 
as the superior official directly responsible to the President of the Constitutional Court.         
A person to be appointed as the Secretary-General of the Office of the Constitutional Court 
must be nominated by the President of the Constitutional Court with the approval of Justices 
of the Constitutional Court collectively. The Office of the Constitutional Court has 
independence in personnel administration, budget and other activities as provided by law.
15
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In this connection, the Office of the Constitutional Court Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) was 
enacted to give effect to the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. According to this 
Act, the Justices of the Constitutional Court collectively have the power to issue regulations 
or notifications with respect to general administration, personnel administration, budget, 
finance and property and other businesses of the Office of the Constitutional Court. Such 
regulations or notifications will be signed by the President of the Constitutional Court and 
come into force upon their publication in the Government Gazette.
16
 
Justices of the Constitutional Court collectively, in practice, play 3 important and 
distinctive roles. For the adjudicative function, the Justices collectively are the Constitutional 
Court. The Justices collectively play a role of the Board of Directors in performing 
administrative affairs of the Office of the Constitutional Court. And, lastly, the Justices 
collectively become the Central Personnel Administration Body for officials of the Office of 
the Constitutional Court. All these show the independence of the Constitutional Court in the 
administration of its own affairs.  
As for the procedures of the Court, the Constitution provides in Section 216 paragraph 
six that the procedures of the Constitutional Court shall be in accordance with the Organic 
Act on Procedures of the Constitutional Court. The Organic Bill on Procedures of the 
Constitutional Court has been submitted for consideration of the House of Representatives 
since 2008. Nevertheless, this Bill is still pending consideration in the House of 
Representatives.  
The Constitution provides in Section 300 paragraph five, as part of its transitional 
provisions, that while the Organic Act on Procedures of the Constitutional Court has not yet 
been enacted, the Constitutional Court has the powers to prescribe rules on procedures and 
rendering of decisions. So the Constitutional Court has issued the “Rules of the Constitutional 
Court on Procedures and Ruling B.E. 2550 (2007)”. The Rules have been applied to every 
case that comes to the Constitutional Court at the present time. Constitutional Court 
procedures under the Rules provide for an inquisitorial system. Any procedure which is not 
specifically provided for under these Rules will be governed by provisions of the Civil 
Procedure Code to the extent that such provisions are applicable and not inconsistent with 
these Rules. 
Budgetary independence  
The Constitutional Court administeres its own budget which is part of the State 
budget. The Constitution provides that the State will allocate adequate budgets for the 
autonomous administration of the Constitutional Court and in consideration of expenditure 
estimates for the Constitutional Court if the Court is of the opinion that the allocated budget 
is insufficient, it will submit a motion to the committee (National Assembly’s Budgetary 
Committee) directly.
17
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As regards the submission of budget estimates, the Office of the Constitutional Court 
Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) stipulates that the Office will submit to the Council of Ministers its 
estimates of the budget in accordance with the resolution of the Justices of the Constitutional 
Court collectively for the purpose of incorporating it in the annual appropriations bill or the 
supplementary appropriations bill, as the case may be, in order to set it aside as subsidies of 
the Justices of the Constitutional Court collectively and the Office of the Constitutional 
Court. In this instance, the Council of Ministers may also prepare the opinion with regard      
to the allocation of budget of the Justices of the Constitutional Court collectively and the 
Office of the Constitutional Court to be included in the memorandum accompanying the 
introduction of the annual appropriations bill or the supplementary appropriations bill. In the 
consideration of the annual appropriations bill or the supplementary appropriations bill, the 
House of Representatives or the Senate may allow the Secretary-General of the Office of the 
Constitutional Court to give explanations.
18
  
As it happens every year, the National Assembly Budgetary Committee or the 
National Assembly rarely changes the budget estimates of the Office of the Constitutional 
Court. 
One outstanding feature of the budgetary management of the Office of the 
Constitutional Court is that the unspended money left over from the previous fiscal years can 
be carried forward to the current fiscal year for spending. However, a report regarding this 
amount has to be submitted to the Council of Ministers at the end of every fiscal year.   
All in all, it could be said that the Constitutional Court has necessary autonomy 
regarding its budget which could contribute to its institutional independence.    
Disciplinary independence 
 Justices of the Constitutional Court are required to follow the Constitutional Court’s 
Guideline for judicial conduct. Serious violation of proper judicial conduct could result in 
criticism by fellow Justices. It is up to the person’s conscience to do what is necessary to 
rectify the wrong. In practice, however, rarely did unproper conducts occur.  
Compliance with decisions of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitution stipulates that the decision of the Constitutional Court will be 
deemed final and binding on the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Courts and 
other State organs.
19
 It is final in the sense that the parties may not file an appeal to any court 
or body. It is binding in the sense that the decisions of the Constitutional Court will be 
binding not only to the parties but also to third parties. Thus, once the Constitutional Court 
passes a ruling, that ruling will be directly binding on the National Assembly, the Council of 
Ministers, the Courts as well as constitutional organs and state agencies in the enactment, 
application and interpretation of laws. 
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In practice, so far, there has never been a case of non-compliance with the decision of 
the Constitutional Court. 
Relationship with the media   
The Constitutional Court attaches great importance to public understanding of the 
works of the Court. In this connection, the Court has undertaken a wide variety of projects, 
some already executed and some to be executed in the future, in order to promote public 
understanding of the role of the Constitutional Court as well as its decisions. For example, 
there are projects of the Court meeting the people in the provinces, quiz competition projects, 
drawing contest projects, etc. Apart from these, books, pamphlets, journals, bulletins, and 
newsletters are regularly prepared and distributed to bring information to the knowledge of 
the public. 
Still, the help of the media is needed because the media can make the Court’s 
proceedings and its ruling comprehensible to the general public. The media, as a matter of 
fact, acts like the public’s eyes and ears. Correct and responsible reporting by the media is 
therefore very important. The good mutual understanding between the Court and the media is 
therefore necessary and desirable. 
The Constitutional Court initiated a dialogue between the Court and the media in the 
form of seminars organized from time to time. At such seminars, the atmosphere was always 
good. Views were usually exchanged frankly and freely. Such seminars will surely be 
organized regularly in the future. 
The Constitutional Court assigns the Office of the Constitutional Court the task of 
communicating with the media. A spokesmen team has been appointed to do this job, 
comprising the Secretary-General and one of the Deputy Secretaries-General of the Office of 
the Constitutional Court. The team usually holds press conference, especially on the day that 
the Constitutional Court renders a decision. Press release briefing the substance of the Court’s 
decision are distributed at this occasion. 
It can be said that, in general, the relationship between the Constitutional Court and 
the media is pretty good. There are, however, two kinds of problems occasionally coming up 
in this relationship.   
The first kind involves inaccurate or misleading reporting of the essence or reasons of 
the Court’s decisions which results from erroneous interpretation of the decisions on the part 
of the media for whatever the reason. This kind of problems could, however, be rectified in 
the future by facilitating or helping the media in the writing of news reports on the Court’s 
decisions. One way is by the Office of the Constitutional Court preparing a decision summary 
couched in laymen’s terms as possible to be distributed to the media. The other way is that 
the Office of the Constitutional Court organizes from time to time a short training course 
about the working and functioning of the Constitutional Court and meaning of legal terms 
usually used in the decisions. 
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Another kind of problems is more serious. It is noted that every time cases which 
could have political implications are under consideration of the Constitutional Court, for 
example, a case involving whether a big political party would be dissolved or not, some 
newspapers then act as a “mouthpiece” of some political groups who have interests in the 
case by reporting only one-side understanding of the story, even rumours, sometimes to the 
point of bringing the Court into disrepute and diminishing or damaging the credibility and 
impartiality of the Court. Such being a case, the Office of the Constitutional Court has no 
choice but to issue explanations concerning the true story in order to dispel misunderstanding 
and correct false impression.  
If the acts on the part of the newspaper amount to defamation or other violations of 
laws, the Office of the Constitutional Court, at the instance of the Justices of the Court 
collectively, will make a complaint to the police to start the criminal proceedings, in 
accordance with due process of law, in the Courts of Justice.  
II. The constitutional independence of individual judges  
While it is admitted that in one sense the individual independence of the judge 
depends on “the state of mind” of that particular judge in the discharge of judicial office, it is 
still important that there should be guarantees of independence of individual judges stipulated 
in either the Constitution or law. In the case of the Constitutional Court of Thailand, a certain 
number of guarantees that support the independence of individual judges are provided in the 
Constitution. 
Selection process 
Since the Constitutional Court is a special judicial organ, the selection for the 9 
Justices of the Constitutional Court is different from judges of other courts. Justices of the 
Constitutional Court are from three sources: 
(a) Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, 3 of whom are elected at a General 
Assembly of the Supreme Court of Justice by secret ballot. 
(b) Justices of the Supreme Administrative Court, 2 of whom are elected at a General 
Assembly of the Supreme Administrative Court by secret ballot. 
(c) Qualified persons, 2 qualified persons in the field of law who genuinely possess 
knowledge and expertise in law and 2 qualified persons in the fields of political science, 
public administration or other social sciences who genuinely possess knowledge and 
expertise in the administration of State affairs.   
The selection process of the Justices of the Constitutional Court is as set out in a 
diagram below: 
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*- 9 elected persons shall hold a meeting and elect one among themselves to be the President 
of the Constitutional Court and notify the result to the President of the Senate accordingly. 
  -The President of the Senate shall countersign the Royal Command appointing the President 
and Justices of the Constitutional Court.  
** The Selection Committee comprises the following: 
1. President of the Supreme Court of Justice; 
2. President of the Supreme Administrative Court; 
3. Speaker of the House of Representatives; 
4. Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives; 
5. One person selected by and amongst Presidents of independent constitutional organs. 
The General Assembly of the 
Supreme Court of Justice 
elects 3 Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Justice 
The Senate passes a 
resolution approving 
the elected persons 
The General Assembly of the 
Supreme Administrative Court 
elects 2 Justices of the Supreme 
Administrative Court 
The President of the Senate tenders to the    
King for the appointment of the President      
and the Justices of the Constitutional Court* 
The King appoints the President and                          
the Justices of the Constitutional Court 
 
 
 
A Selection Committee** selects 
and elects 2 qualified persons in the 
field of law and 2 qualified persons 
in the fields of political science, 
public administration or other   
social sciences  
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It can be seen that, among the 9 Justices, 5 Justices are elected by the Judiciary while 
the other 4 are elected by the Legislature. The Executive has minimal, if any, part in the 
election of the Justices of the Constitutional Court. Indeed, it could be said that the 
government has only one small voice through the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 
the Selection Committee of qualified persons since usually the Speaker is from the ruling 
political party or one of the ruling political parties. The Justices of the Constitutional Court 
therefore owe no duty of “gratitude” to those who elected them, thus enhancing their 
individual independence. 
 Professional qualifications 
The Justices of the Constitutional Court have high professional qualifications. Five 
among the nine Justices are from the highest courts of the Judiciary, namely the Supreme 
Court of Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court. The other four, those who have been 
elected as qualified persons in the field of law or the fields of political science, public 
administration or other social sciences, also have high qualifications in that they must have 
been a Minister, a judge of the Supreme Military Court, an Election Commissioner, an 
Ombudsman, a National Counter Corruption Commissioner, a State Audit Commissioner or a 
National Human Rights Commissioner, or having served in a position of not lower than 
Deputy Attorney-General, Director-General or a person holding an administrative position in 
a government agency having administrative powers equivalent to a Director-General, or 
holding a position of not lower than Professor or having been a lawyer practicing legal 
profession regularly and continuously for not less than thirty years up to the date of 
nomination. 
The Justices of the Constitutional Court are equal. The President is the “first among 
equals (primus inter pares)”. However, the election for the position of the President has to be 
done among themselves at the beginning of the term of office before the Royal Appointment 
or whenever the position is vacant thereafter. Therefore, there is no question of the 
promotional “temptations” as such. 
Age and term of office  
The minimum age for qualified persons in the field of law and the fields of political 
sciences, public administration or other social sciences to be elected to become Justices of the 
Constitutional Court is 45 years. There is no minimum age as far as Justices of the 
Constitutional Court who come from the Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme 
Administrative Court are concerned. Of course, in practice, any person who could reach the 
positions of Justices of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court 
usually are older than 45 years. 
The term of office for the President and Justices of the Constitutional Court is 9 years. 
They will hold office for only one term. 
In addition to the vacation of office upon the expiration of term, the President and 
Justices of the Constitutional Court vacate office upon: 
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(1) death; 
(2) being of seventy years of age; 
(3) resignation; 
(4) being disqualified or being under any of the prohibitions; 
(5) having done an act in violation of incompatibilities; 
(6) the Senate passing the resolution for the removal from office; 
(7) being sentenced by a judgment to imprisonment notwithstanding the case not 
being final or the suspension of sentence, except the case of an offence committed through 
negligence, a petty offence or a defamation offence.
20
 
The removal from office by the Senate will be elaborated below. 
The fixed term of office and non-renewability certainly serve as a guarantee for 
individual independence of the President and Justices of the Constitutional Court.  
Material benefits 
The Constitution stipulates that salaries, emoluments and other benefits of judges 
shall be as prescribed by law; provided that the system of salary-scale or emoluments 
applicable to civil servants shall not be applied. The said provisions also apply to Election 
Commissioners, Ombudsmen, National Counter Corruption Commissioners and State Audit 
Commissioners mutatis mutandis.
21
 In this connection, there is a separate Act on salaries, 
emoluments and other benefits of the President and Justices of the Constitutional Court. The 
level of salaries, emoluments and other benefits of the President and Justices of the 
Constitutional Court is, in principle, on par with those of the Presidents and Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court at a reasonable level 
commensurate with the positions concerned. It is believed that the level of salaries, 
emoluments and other benefits would promote the independence of those Justices. 
Incompatibilities 
According to the Constitution
22
, the President and Justices of the Constitutional Court 
must not be a government official holding a permanent position or receiving a salary. Nor can 
they be an official or employee of a State agency, State enterprise or local government 
organization or a director or adviser of a State enterprise or State agency. The other 
prohibitions are: they must not hold any position in a partnership, a company or an 
organization carrying out business with a view to sharing benefits or incomes, or be an 
employee of any person and they must not engage in any other independent profession. These 
incompatibilities start to be applied when the person concerned assumes his duty: he must 
have resigned from those positions mentioned above or must produced credible evidence that 
his engagement in such independent profession has ceased to exist. However, at the time of 
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being elected to the position of the President or a Justice of the Constitutional Court he must 
not be under any of the prohibitions: 
(a) he must not be a member of the House of Representatives, senator, political 
official, member of a local assembly or local administrator; 
(b) he must not be or have been a member or holder of other position of a political 
party over the period of three years preceding the taking of office; 
(c) he must not be an Election Commissioner, an Ombudsman, a National Counter 
Corruption Commissioner, a State Audit Commissioner or a National Human Rights 
Commissioner. 
The purpose of having these constitutional limitations is to prevent the Justice from 
being in a situation of conflict of interests or a situation that could compromise his 
independence. 
Removal from office or impeachment process 
The President and Justices of the Constitutional Court who are under exhibited 
circumstances of unusual wealthiness indicative of the commission of corruption, 
malfeasance in office, malfeasance in judicial office or an intentional exercise of power 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or law or serious violation or failure to comply 
with ethical standards, may be removed from office by the Senate.
23
    
The process may be initiated by the lodging of complaint to the President of the 
Senate requesting the Senate to pass a resolution removing the person from office by either of 
the following: 
(a) members of the House of Representatives of not less than one-fourth of the total 
number of the existing members of the House; or 
(b) senators of not less than one-fourth of the total number of the existing members of 
the Senate; or 
(c) voters of not less than twenty thousand in number. 
The complaint must clearly itemize the circumstances in which such a person has 
allegedly committed the act.
24
 
The President of the Senate then refers the matter to the National Counter Corruption 
Commission for inquisition without delay. When the inquisition is completed, the National 
Counter Corruption Commission will prepare a report for submission to the Senate. Such a 
report will clearly state whether, and to what extent, the accusation stated in the complaint 
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contains a prima facie case, whether there are convincing evidences, and the resolution 
therefor.
25
 
Upon receipt of the report of the National Counter Corruption Commission,              
the President of the Senate will convoke a sitting of the Senate for considering the said   
matter without delay. A senator will have independence in casting a vote by secret ballot.                 
A resolution for the removal of any person from office must be passed by the votes of not   
less than three-fifth of the total number of the existing members of the Senate.
26
 
The Oath of office 
In Thailand, before taking office, every judge must have an audience with His 
Majesty the King to make a solemn declaration before the King in the following words: 
“I (name of the declarer) do solemnly declare that I will be loyal to His Majesty the 
King and will faithfully perform my duties in the name of the King without any partiality in 
the interest of justice, of the people and of the public order of the Kingdom. I will also uphold 
and observe the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State, the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand and the law in every respect.”27 
Any solemn declaration before the King is considered the sacred act in Thailand. It is 
therefore widely believed that this declaration should as least serve as a constant reminder to 
each individual judge that he should abide by the declaration in the discharge of his judicial 
office, thereby promoting his independence.  
III. Operating procedures of the Constitutional Court 
Standing (locus standi) before the Constitutional Court  
The Constitutional Court, as a court, cannot start the proceeding by itself at its own 
initiative. There must be some subjects who have legal standing (locus standi) according to 
the Constitution to file an application with the Constitutional Court to start the case. The 
Constitution provides that Courts of Justice, Administrative Courts, Military Courts, 
Constitutional organs, holders of certain important political positions, members of the House 
of Representatives, senators, Attorney-General and persons whose rights and liberties have 
been infringed have the right to file an application with the Constitutional Court for a ruling 
or order. 
The filing of an application has to be in accordance with the procedures and 
conditions stipulated in the Constitution. Just to give examples. For a constitutional review of 
a bill, only the Speaker of the House of Representatives, President of the Senate, President of 
the National Assembly and the Prime Minister will have locus standi before the 
Constitutional Court. However, for the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the 
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President of the Senate or the President of the National Assembly (the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives also holds this position) to do so, he must be requested by members of the 
House of Representatives, Senators or members of both Houses constituting no fewer than 
one-tenth of the existing members of the those Houses. Or in the case of a constitutional 
review of provisions of promulgated laws, only Courts of Justice, Administrative Courts and 
Military Courts can apply for ruling if the court finds on its own accord or a party to the case 
objects with reasons that a provision of law to be applied to the case is contrary to or 
inconsistent with the Constitution.
28
  
A priori and a posteriori constitutional reviews 
Thailand’s system provides for both a prior and a posteriori constitutional reviews. 
Just two examples of a priori review cases.  
1. A priori review of an Organic Bill before it is presented to the King for Royal 
Signature. This is compulsory. The Constitutional Court has to complete its determination of 
its constitutionality within thirty days.
29
    
2. A priori review of a Bill before it is presented to the King for Royal Signature.       
If either members of the House of Representatives, senators or members of the both Houses 
of the National Assembly constituting no fewer than one tenth of the existing members of 
both Houses or the Prime Minister finds that such a bill contains provisions which are 
contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution or the enactment process as provided by the 
Constitution was not properly complied with.
30
  
In its a priori review, the Constitutional Court will look into the substance of the bill 
as well as the enactment process. The effect of the Constitutional Court’s decision will be 
examined in the next item regarding the role of “negative legislator”. 
A posterior review, on the other hand, is a review of promulgated law in a concrete 
case. Contentious constitutional issues are usually referred to the Constitutional Court by the 
Courts of Justice, the Administrative Courts or the Military Courts. But the system in the 
Constitution also allows the Ombudsmen
31
 and the National Human Rights Commission
32
 to 
file applications to the Constitutional Court. Moreover, a person whose rights and liberties 
recognized by the Constitution has been violated by a provision of law has the right to file an 
application with the Constitutional Court for a ruling. However, in a case of complaint such 
as this all legal remedies must have been exhausted. 
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In its a posteriori review, the Constitutional Court can only look into the substance of 
the promulgated law. If the provisions of law are found to be contrary to or inconsistent with 
the Constitution they will be unenforceable.
33
 
Role of “negative legislator” 
In case of a priori review of an organic bill, if the Constitutional Court decides that 
the provisions of an organic bill are contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution, such 
provisions shall lapse. But if the Constitutional Court decides that such provisions are the 
essential element thereof or the organic bill has not been duty enacted under the provisions of 
the Constitution, such organic bill shall lapse.
34
   
However, in the case where a decision of the Constitutional Court results in the lapse 
of provisions contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution as stated above, such organic 
bill will be returned to the House of the Representatives and the Senate respectively for their 
reconsideration. The House of Representatives or the Senate will amend the organic bill by 
removing the provisions which are contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
organic bill will then proceed towards promulgation.
35
 
In a priori review of an ordinary bill, the Constitution prescribes that if the 
Constitutional Court rules that such bill contains provisions which are contrary to or 
inconsistent with the Constitution, or has not been enacted in accordance with the provisions 
of this Constitution, and such provisions constitute an essential substance, the entire bill will 
lapse.
36
 Such being a case, the enactment process for that bill will have to be restarted. 
However, if the Constitutional Court rules that such bill contains provisions which are 
contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution, but do not constitute an essential substance, 
only such contrary or inconsistent provision will lapse. The bill without the lapsed provisions, 
however, will be able to come into force upon promulgation.
37
 
These provisions of the Constitution show that in Thailand, a role of “negative 
legislator” played by the Constitutional Court is the acceptable norm for the Legislature. 
Dissenting Opinions 
The Constitution provides that the quorum of Justices of the Constitutional Court for 
hearing and rendering a decision will consist of not less than five Justices. The decision of the 
Constitutional Court will be made by a majority of votes, unless otherwise provided in the 
Constitution. Every Justice of the Constitutional Court who constitutes a quorum will give an 
opinion on his own part and make an oral statement to the meeting before passing a 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., section 6. 
34
 Ibid., section 141 para 2. 
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resolution. The decisions of the Constitutional Court and the opinions of all Justices will be 
published in the Government Gazette.
38
  
From this provision, it can be seen that the Justices of the Constitutional Court of 
Thailand are free to have separate opinions or dissenting opinions. Transparency is served 
since the Court’s decisions as well as each Justice’s opinion will appear in the Government 
Gazette. The process will surely enhance the independence of individual Justices.   
Process of deliberation of the Court 
The Justices of the Constitutional Court collectively will consider a case after 
accepting it for consideration and ruling. However, when an application has been filed with 
the Constitutional Court, the President usually appoints no fewer than three Justices to have 
charge of the case. The duties of Justices in charge are: consideration whether to accept the 
application for consideration and ruling or not; have charge over the case file; and issue any 
order which does not constitute a ruling of the case. An order of Justices in charge of a case 
will be made by a majority vote. 
At present, the President has appointed two groups of four Justices in charge and it 
works well. 
The Court which means the Justices of the Court collectively considers the case in 
camera. Confidentiality has to be preserved strictly. In the deliberation, the Justices are free 
to state their opinions on the case. The decision of the Court will be taken by votes on each 
issue of the case as set by the Court. No abstention will be allowed. 
The confidentiality of the deliberation of the Constitutional Court will serve as a 
guarantee for the Court’s independence. 
CONCLUSION 
 Independence is a very important tenet of the judiciary, including the Constitutional 
Courts. It is a means which enables judges to decide cases impartially, without fear or favour, 
affection or ill will. The guarantees of independence of the Constitutional Court of Thailand 
as an institution as well as the constitutional independence of individual justices as provided 
in the Constitution and related laws are certainly necessary. But are they sufficient? May be 
not. 
 At the present time, when diverse challenges – or even threats – to independence of 
the Constitutional Court happen to be on the rise, supports from the executive, the legislators, 
the administrators, the media, civil society organizations and the public in general are 
required. It is admitted that the diversity of challenges to independence of the Constitutional 
Court calls for diverse answers to how independence of the Constitutional Court could be 
defended and reinforced, both in the short term and long term. 
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 In facing these challenges, the “state of mind” of the Justices of the Constitutional 
Court becomes all the more important. The Justices must stand firm, face the difficulties with 
great fortitude, and also maintain the high level of resilience in the discharge of their judicial 
duties with impartiality. Especially, they must abide by their oath of office solemnly declared 
before His Majesty the King at the time of their taking office. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
